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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

. Chapter 11

IN RE:

. Case No. 20-12168(CSS)

TOWN SPORTS INTERNATIONAL,

LLC, et al,

. 824 Market Street

. Wilmington, Delaware 19801

Debtors. .

. Monday, December 14, 2020

TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONIC HEARING RE:
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT APPROVAL AND PLAN CONFIRMATION
BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. SONTCHI
CHIEF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

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(Appearances Continued)

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(Proceedings commence at 2:00 p.m.)

THE OPERATOR: Recording has begun, we are now live.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody. This is Judge Sontchi. We're here in Town Sports, Case 20-12168.

Just a couple of quick matters, and I'll turn it over to Mr. Altman on a day that's not a Friday, which is a change.

All of the audio has been muted on Zoom, all of your audio is through CourtCall. Please mute your phones when you are not speaking, that's very important, and try to remember to un-mute them when you are speaking, which is also important, but not as important as muting them in the first place.

We are proceeding by Zoom, thank you for appearing by Zoom. Feel free to black out your screens, if you wish; however, I do require that you have your screen and camera turned on if you are addressing the Court or if you are testifying, either through direct examination, introduction of an affidavit, cross-examination, or a proffer, so that I can make sure the witness is present. If we have any incidents, I will do my best to take care of them. If I can't resolve them, we will continue, but we'll do it by CourtCall only, and we'll terminate the Zoom portion of the hearing.

I think that pretty much takes care of it, and I'll 1 2 turn it over to Mr. Altman. 3 MR. ALTMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. Josh Altman of Kirkland & Ellis on behalf of Town Sports International. 4 5 Your Honor, can you hear me okay? 6 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 7 MR. ALTMAN: Excellent. Thank you. 8 Your Honor, the only item today on the agenda that 9 is up is approval of the debtors' disclosure statement on a final basis and confirmation of the debtors' second amended 10 plan. I'm just going to fix the screen here, Your Honor. 11 12 There we go. 13 Your Honor, with respect to evidence, the facts and 14 circumstances supporting confirmation of the plan are set 15 forth in -- first and primarily, in the declaration of John 16 Didonato filed at Docket Number 774. Mr. Didonato is with us 17 on Zoom today. I would ask that we move his declaration into 18 evidence. 19 THE COURT: I don't see him. 20 MR. DIDONATO: Your Honor, I am -- I apologize, 21 Your Honor. John DiDonato. I'm having difficulty with Zoom,

gaining access. I will keep trying --

MR. BUCHBINDER: Yeah, Your Honor, this is Dave Buchbinder. I have the same problem. I keep getting an invalid meeting ID.

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MR. DIDONATO: I do, as well. 1 2 THE COURT: All right. Well, then you might have 3 the wrong ID, so let's just make sure. Give me just a 4 minute. I'm doing this myself, so it takes a little longer, 5 so just give me a moment, please. (Pause in proceedings) 6 7 THE COURT: All right. It should be Meeting 160 000 7545. And the passcode is 237106. We'll wait for a few 8 9 minutes. MR. DIDONATO: Your Honor, I had that instruction. 10 It actually said invalid before you get to that step, so I'm 11 12 going to restart my computer and attempt to get on. I 13 apologize. 14 THE COURT: It's okay. We are going to wait --15 UNIDENTIFIED: John, check your -- John, check your 16 email, please. 17 MR. DIDONATO: Yeah, I will. 18 MR. BUCHBINDER: Your Honor, this is Dave 19 Buchbinder. I've booted out and booted in twice and I've 20 used the original agenda and the amended agenda, and I get 21 the same problem every time. 22 THE COURT: Huh. Let me send you the link, Mr.

Buchbinder. Do you have access to your work email? MR. BUCHBINDER: Yes, sir, I do.

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THE COURT: Okay. I think I've got you in here.

1 After 15 years on the bench, if I haven't sent you and email 2 -- there you are, there we go. 3 MR. BUCHBINDER: Let's see if there's someone else 4 -- let's see if it works this way. 5 THE COURT: I'm sending you the email link, as 6 That's the one right off my page as host. We do have 7 33 people who made it on, so I'm not sure what the problem 8 is. 9 MR. BUCHBINDER: Yeah. 10 (Pause in proceedings) THE COURT: Here you come. 11 12 (Pause in proceedings) 13 THE COURT: All right. Hello, Mr. Buchbinder. 14 Glad to have you. 15 Do we have the witness yet? 16 MR. DIDONATO: I'm rebooting, Your Honor, and 17 hopefully we'll get there momentarily. I apologize again. 18 THE COURT: All right. Certainly. Look, if -- it 19 absolutely never ceases to amaze me that we're making this 20 all work for the last nine months, so this is nothing 21 compared to what I feared back in March. So we will take our 22 time and get it done right. It will give me a chance to read 23 the pile of documents that the debtors sent over 15 minutes 24 before the hearing. 25 MR. DIDONATO: Your Honor, I apologize.

1 coming up invalid meeting ID minus one in parenthesis. 2 keep trying, but --3 THE COURT: No, that's all right. That's -- let's 4 do it this way. Is there any objection to the witness 5 appearing solely by audio because of exigent circumstances, 6 for purposes of admission of his direct testimony by 7 affidavit and any supplemental direct or proffer or cross? 8 (No verbal response) 9 THE COURT: All right. I hear none. 10 I am going to allow that. Generally speaking, I 11 really shouldn't, but I think, given the exigent circumstances of the fact that we have 40 people on this call 12 13 ready to go forward with this hearing, an important hearing 14 for the debtor, and the gremlins of IT have struck, I am 15 going to allow it. 16 So, Mr. Altman, you can proceed as if your witness 17 were on the video. I think, at that -- at this point, you 18 had offered his affidavit, I believe. Wait, this might be 19 him. 20 MR. DIDONATO: I might be able to -- I'll keep 21 trying, Your Honor (indiscernible) 22 THE COURT: No, I think I see -- hang on. 23 MR. DIDONATO: Okay. 24 THE COURT: I'm letting you in.

MR. DIDONATO: Okay.

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THE COURT: There you are, and you're sideways.
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                 MR. DIDONATO: Yeah, I made it.
 3
                 THE COURT: Perfect. We'll take you --
                 MR. DIDONATO: (Indiscernible)
 4
 5
                 THE COURT: -- any way we can get you.
                 MR. DIDONATO: I'll try getting --
 6
 7
                 THE COURT: Don't touch anything.
 8
                 MR. DIDONATO: -- myself right-side up.
 9
                 THE COURT: No, no, no.
10
                 MR. DIDONATO: Okay.
                 THE COURT: Don't touch anything.
11
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                 MR. DIDONATO: All right. Maybe I can
13
       turn my computer sideways, Your Honor. There we go.
14
                 THE COURT: That's even better, now you're upside-
15
       down.
16
            (Laughter)
17
                 THE COURT: All right.
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                 MR. DIDONATO: Thank you. Thank you, Your Honor.
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                 THE COURT: You're welcome.
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                 All right. Our witness is here. The -- any
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       objection to admission of the affidavit?
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            (No verbal response)
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                 THE COURT: It's admitted without objection.
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            (Didonato Declaration received in evidence)
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                 THE COURT: After all this, somebody really has to
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12 1 ask him a question. Does anybody wish to cross-examine the 2 witness? 3 (No verbal response) 4 THE COURT: All right. I hear none and I have no 5 questions. So thank you very much. And it's good to have 6 you here because it's good to follow the Federal Rules of 7 Evidence and the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. Very good. 8 Mr. Altman. 9 MR. ALTMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 Your Honor, the voting declaration of Ms. Kjontvedt from Epiq Global Solutions was filed at Docket Number 775. 11 12 We do have -- as I'll address in just a moment -- a 13 supplemental declaration that is being worked on that will be 14 filed. Not to steal the thunder from future me, but that 15 supplemental declaration is going to show that Class 4 did 16 vote to accept the plan. 17 For now, I propose that we move in the declaration 18 filed at 775. And then, hopefully, that will be on file --19 hopefully, the revised supplemental will be on file prior to 20 the end of the hearing, and we'll move that into evidence, as 21 well, at that time. 22 THE COURT: All right. And I see the witness here. 23 Any objection to the admission of the declaration?

THE COURT: Okay. I hear none. It's admitted

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(No verbal response)

without objection.

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(Kjontvedt Declaration received in evidence)

THE COURT: Does anyone wish to cross-examine the witness? Of course, all rights are reserved with the supplemental declaration.

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: I hear none, I have no questions.

MR. ALTMAN: Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, with respect to background, just to level-set, we filed these cases 91 days ago, on September 14th. If Your Honor recalls, we came in with a bit of a messy situation. We had two competing sale and DIP proposals from different subsets of lenders, one that held a majority of the term loan and one that did not. We also had a business that was obviously affected by COVID-19, in that it was gyms, and people were not allowed into them or were choosing to not go to them, for risk of COVID-19 infection.

As Your Honor is aware, we went with the group that we've been calling the "term lender group" that held 50 -- more than 50 percent in amount. And it was at that stage that we really set out the deal and the settlement terms that were the foundation of this case. We implemented the going concern sale and sold the business for an eighty-million-dollar credit bid, along with an agreement by the purchaser to provide \$1 million to general unsecured creditors. that

transaction saved over a thousand jobs, kept gyms open in the company's main markets, and we believe was a good outcome for all constituents.

After the committee was appointed, but prior to solicitation, we resolved the committee's plan objections by building in a non-released claims trust, resulting in a global settlement with the committee, the debtors, and the term lender group. That non-released claims trust is with respect to certain claims that were being brought by Attorneys General in various states, so that the committee or the liquidating trust could pursue those claims against certain directors on a post-petition basis. Those claims, or at least the economic benefit of those claims or the economic impact of those claims — or the pre-petition claim because all of the alleged wrongdoing or claims arose pre-petition. And the committee filed a statement in support of the plan at Docket Number 707, recommending all general unsecured creditors to vote to accept the plan.

Your Honor, while the plan, at this stage, is, you know, essentially a liquidation plan, I wanted to provide all that background because what all the parties involved here believe is that we did do a successful and complete a successful going concern transaction in this case. To that end, I wanted to thank the various professionals that were involved because that is no small feat in the current

situation: The committee, represented by Mr. Van Aalten and Mr. Alberto at Cole Schotz; Gibson Dunn, representing the term lender group, Mr. Greenberg and Mr. Goldstein; DLA Piper, who represented the purchaser Mr. Chesley and Mr. Grant; and Mr. Chubak from Amini, LLC, who represented the purchaser kind of in the closing stages. We wanted to thank all of them for their efforts getting us to where we are today.

Your Honor, as we stand here today, as I alluded to earlier, we did have an issue until about 45 minutes ago with respect to Class 4 voting to accept and support the plan.

That -- what that issue was, we learned after filing our brief, is that the lenders and Peak are still negotiating a shareholders agreement. So the lenders don't technically have the 20 percent equity in the purchaser entity. It was that issue that was holding up them voting to support the plan.

We included language at Paragraph 70, at Docket

Number 797, which is the revised form of order we filed just
a few moments ago you were alluding to. That language
clarifies that the release in the plan is only as effective
as between the lender group and Class 4 and the purchaser and
DIP lenders after that equity is distributed and they've
reached a mutually agreeable shareholders agreement. And the
release is otherwise effective as to all other parties.

With that, Your Honor, Mr. Goldstein, just literally a minute or two before the hearing, sent over the last ballots from members of his group that will, when put in with all of the other ballots, show that we have a supporting class by both numerosity and amount at Class 4 in all debtors. So that is going to resolve any issues with resent to -- with respect to cramming up the Class 4 debtors and will make today go, hopefully, a lot smoother, as soon as we get that on file.

Your Honor, I just wanted to pause and ask if Your Honor had any questions with respect to that issue.

THE COURT: The last thing I'm going to do is ask any questions about late-filed ballots in this case or any other in the United States, but it sounds like it's a good solution.

MR. ALTMAN: Thank you, Your Honor. And just to be clear, we did accept all late-filed ballots; there's been no picking and choosing on that front.

Your Honor, with respect to plan objections, as we set out in the objection chart filed as Exhibit A to the confirmation brief, we received very few substantive objections. And we believe that all of those, with the exception of two objections from the United States Trustee, have been resolved.

With respect to the unresolved UST issues, there

are two issues: First is the inclusion of committee -- the committee in the 9019 language, and the second is the debtor being included as a released party, as that might implicate a discharge.

I'll take the 9019 issue first. I believe that we've reached a resolution with Mr. Buchbinder and the United States Trustee's Office by me just confirming on the record that that settlement is with the committee. That's the plain language of what we wrote in the confirmation order. We are not saying that any individual creditor agreed to that, although they did vote overwhelmingly in support of the plan. But the actual 9019 is with the committee, who we, of course, believe has the right to -- as a representative -- as an estate fiduciary, has the ability to settle in this case.

With respect to the released party issue, Your

Honor, the crux of the argument, as we understand it, is that

the debtors are not entitled to a discharge under eleven

forty -- is that, because the debtors are not entitled to a

discharge under 1141, they can't be a released party as to a

consensual third-party release.

I'll note here that there was a very-late-filed objection just about an hour ago from the Attorneys General for Washington and Massachusetts, joining in the United States Trustee's objection on this front.

Your Honor, we believe this is conflating issues.

We worked with Mr. Buchbinder prior to solicitation to remove references from an 1141 -- with respect to an 1141 debtor discharge, given that this plan is effectively a liquidation plan. That is a separate issue than if a third party chooses to release the debtors as part of a consensual third-party release. That's their prerogative, that's their contract right. They could have opted out of the release; they chose not to.

And the notion that third parties can't consensually release debtors because the debtors are not entitled to a discharge, frankly, misses the entire point of a consensual third-party release. Debtors have been included as released parties in many plans confirmed by Your Honor and in courts around the country. I could list a ton of them, I have several in front of me: APC Automotive, Anna Holdings, EB Energy, Charming Charlie, American Bank -- commonly referred to as "Horsehead Holdings" -- those were just a few in front of Your Honor in the last few years.

With that, Your Honor, we're going to respectfully request that Your Honor overrules the United States Trustee's objections, as we both -- we think that both of them, both of the remaining objections, are not founded in law or find support in the cases that Your Honor would find binding.

With respect to one other objection, Your Honor -this is the objection filed at Docket Number 756, by the

landlord at the TSI Bayonne entity. We have reached a resolution with them. It is a confirmation objection, but it's really resolving their first omnibus rejection motion and administrative claims motion they filed.

The resolution involves a post-petition rent allowed administrative claim of \$65,000 and payment within 5 business days of the effective date of a plan, an agreement that the debtors can abandon property free and clear at their -- at the leased premises. And with respect to leased treadmills at the property, the landlord is going to cooperate in facilitating the retrieval of those treadmills; or, alternatively, enter into an agreement with respect to those treadmills.

We did file a revised confirmation order. That redline reflects, I believe, everything I just addressed, as well as one revision -- or one modification in Paragraph 66 that was intended to address that we do not yet have the Class 4 voting declaration on file. And so we put in a construct, whereby Your Honor can enter the confirmation order, and then that declaration can prove to -- you know, the filing of that declaration can implement the accepting voting classes; or, alternatively, we can obviously wait until that declaration is on file and then have the order entered, and we'll remove that language at Paragraph 66.

Your Honor, with respect to the other 1129 factors

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THE COURT: Well, let's deal with the objections -- hang on. Let's deal with the objections, Mr. Altman.

Mr. Buchbinder?

MR. ALTMAN: Sounds great.

MR. BUCHBINDER: Thank you, Your Honor. Dave Buchbinder on behalf of the U.S. Trustee.

I would agree that the remaining issues -- I would go over them as twofold: A, whether or not the debtor is entitled to a discharge in a liquidating case; and B, whether a debtor may be considered a released party for purposes of a third-party release provision.

Let's start with Section 1141(d). 1141(d)(3) specifically tells us how a non-individual debtor -- or how a debtor receives a discharge in a Chapter 11 case, and it reads:

"Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, in the plan, or in the order confirming the plan, the confirmation discharges the debtor from a debt that arose" --

I'm going to skip (a) because I'll go to (d)(3):
"The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if:

"(A) The plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the estate;

1 "(B) The debtor does not engage in business after 2 consummation of the plan;" 3 And: "(C) The debtor would be denied a discharge under 4 5 Section 720(a) of this title if the case were a 6 case under Chapter 7 of this title." 7 Article 9.A of this plan is entitled "Final Satisfaction of Claims and Termination of Interests" and 8 9 begins with the preamble, "To the maximum extent provided for 10 by Section 1141(d)." Yes, the debtor removed the word "discharge" from the substance of the text between the 11 12 original draft and the present draft, but did not change the 13 substance of the provision. 14 Section 1141(d)(3), let's work backwards through 15 it. Would this debtor be entitled to a discharge if the case 16 were a Chapter 7? No, the debtor would not because the 17 debtor is not an individual. 18 Second, did the debtor liquidate -- has the debtor 19 liquidated substantially all of its assets? By admission, it 20 has. 21 Third, is the debtor going to engage in business 22 post-confirmation? No, it is not. It has admitted as much, 2.3 except to wind down the affairs of the estate, and that is 24 not sufficient to provide a discharge.

There is no provision in the Code to allow

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creditors in a Chapter 11 liquidation plan, as opposed to reorganization plan, a vote on whether or not the debtor gets a discharge. That is not one of the methods provided for by Section 1141(d)(3). And this debtor would not be entitled to a discharge if the case were a Chapter 7 and creditors do not get to vote on a discharge in a Chapter 7 case.

So that next raises the question of whether the debtor can propose that creditors vote for a discharge directly if they voted for the plan, or whether that can be done indirectly in some way.

Let's deal first with the directly part. Once again, there's no provision for voting on it. Section 105 does allow the debtor to propose provisions not inconsistent with the Code. Section 1123(b)(6) allows a plan to contain provisions not inconsistent with the Code. But proposing that debtors can vote for a discharge in a liquidation plan is not among the list of options provided for by the plain language of the Code.

Recent Supreme Court history in commercial cases, in the RadLAX case, and in consumer cases, in the Law v. Siegal case, have unequivocally held that you can't do, through indirection, what you can't do directly. So you can't use Section 1123(b)(6), and you can't use Section 105 to circumvent Section 1141(b)(3) or Section 727(a). If it's an issue that we haven't previously argued, it doesn't make

it carved in stone.

And the fact that counsel is contending that it should have been raised at the disclosure statement stage?

Well, it was. By agreement, everyone agreed it was a confirmation issue. And if that's not the case, then we have to be resolving these matters at the disclosure statement stage.

So let's move on to whether or not the debtor can receive an indirect discharge. One way is the debtors' proposal that, gee, they got to vote for it. But the plain language of the Code doesn't permit that.

So now let's take -- next look at this: Can the debtor be a released party to benefit from a third-party release clause? Let's look at the genesis of third-party release clauses. They don't emanate because of the debtor; they emanate because of nondebtors. The entire bevy of litigation and debate about third-party releases emanates from Section 524(e) of the Code, which reads:

"Except as provided in Subsection (a)(3)" -Which concerns itself with joint debtors in
individual cases.

"-- discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on or the property of any other entity for such debt."

Well, first of all, it should be rather obvious,

patent, and fundamental that the debtor is not a third party.

And to write your plan to simply define the debtor as if the debtor were a released party, it's a fantasy. It's as much a fantasy as the loser of an election claiming to be the winner.

So, by making the debtor a released party and giving the creditors the opportunity to opt out or opt in, it is, again, the equivalent of providing the debtor a discharge in a way that the Code simply does not permit for the reasons stated. The Bankruptcy Code says what it means and it means what it says. It's improper to provide a debtor with a discharge in a liquidating case. Article 9.A should be stricken and removed with a very simple paragraph that the debtor is not entitled to a discharge, or 9.A simply be removed.

With respect to the third-party release provision, we have not objected to any other aspect of it that this

Court would, I think, consider deeply. And if the word -- if the debtors are removed from the definition of "released parties," then the provision is acceptable. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: You're welcome.

Does anyone else wish to be heard on this issue? (No verbal response)

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Altman, reply?

MR. ALTMAN: Yes, Your Honor. Sorry, I'm just 1 2 having some technical difficulties myself here, Your Honor. 3 (Participants speak simultaneously) UNIDENTIFIED: It sounds like someone is speaking 4 5 through the Zoom from the Attorney General's Office of a 6 state that I didn't quite catch. 7 THE COURT: I'm not hearing people. We're not 8 hearing people through Zoom. 9 (Participants speak simultaneously) (Participants confer) 10 11 MS. KAVANAGH: Your Honor, this is Shennan Kavanagh 12 from the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office. Can you 13 hear me? 14 THE COURT: Yes, ma'am. 15 UNIDENTIFIED: Go for it, Shennan. 16 MS. KAVANAGH: Okay. Nancy put together an 17 argument that I will read on her behalf. 18 Good afternoon, Your Honor. Thank you for hearing 19 My name is Shennan Kavanagh, I'm the Deputy Chief of the 20 Consumer Protection Division at the Massachusetts Attorney 21 General's Office. And with me my CourtCall is my colleague Sarah Petrie. Also, from the District of Columbia's Attorney 22 23 General's Office, you have Nancy Alper, Senior Assistant 24 Attorney General. And with her are Lindsay Marks and Naomi

Claxton, Assistant Attorneys General, representing the

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District.

Due to the technological difficulties, I will proceed. Is that okay with you, Nancy?

(No verbal response)

MS. KAVANAGH: Okay. Thank you very much for hearing us, Your Honor. This morning, we filed a joinder to the United States Trustee's objection of the confirmation of the Chapter 11 plan for the same reasons that the U.S. Trustee, Mr. Buchbinder, just articulated. And if I might, Your Honor, I will just review our argument with you.

Specifically, Your Honor, for the states and the District, several states and the District of Columbia have brought consumer protection actions in their own State Courts against the debtors. But the debtors' plan appears to be — to use a term borrowed from the game Monopoly — a "get out of liability card," with respect to the exculpation and the discharge and release provisions that the U.S. Trustee has also objected to.

The plan has multiple provisions dealing with releases and injunctions to protect the debtor and its related parties -- including its officers, directors, and managers -- from liability. In essence, the Debtor TSI is seeking a discharge of all potential liability for it and its insiders.

As Section 9.A of the debtors' first amended joint

Chapter 11 plan provides:

"To the maximum extent provided for by Section 1141 of the Bankruptcy Code, and except as otherwise specifically provided in the plan or in any contract, instrument, or other agreement or document created pursuant to the plan, the distribution, rights, and treatments that are provided in the plan shall be complete satisfaction and release, effective as of the effective date, of claims, interests, and causes of action of any nature whatsoever."

Black-letter law, however, requires that such a plan be denied confirmation on the grounds that a liquidating corporate debtor is not entitled to a discharge. Section 1141(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code makes clear that a liquidating corporate debtor is not entitled to a discharge in bankruptcy. Section 1141(b)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in pertinent part, that, quote:

"The confirmation of a plan does not discharge a debtor if:

"(A) The plan provides for the liquidation of all or substantially all of the property of the estate;"

And:

"(B) The debtor does not engage in business after

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consummation of the plan;"

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Here, the debtor is not an individual. It is a corporate entity, which is ostensively liquidating its assets, and which will not continue in business post-confirmation.

In addition, Your Honor, the District and the Commonwealth take the position that the Debtor TSI's plan was filed in bad faith, in an attempt to avoid the outstanding liability for which the District, the Commonwealth, and the other states have filed consumer protection lawsuits. In the Attorneys General litigation, the states and the District of Columbia uniformly have alleged the debtor has engaged in false and misleading statements and misrepresentations concerning members' rights to cancel their memberships, to receive funds, and/or to transfer their memberships to gym locations still open for business.

Membership dues and fees constitute the income streams that provides Debtor TSI with the revenue necessary for debtor to maintain its business operations. As Debtor TSI reported in its September 2020 filling with the Securities and Exchange Commission, debtor needs this cash from its operations to, quote, "fund the working capital needs of its business." By denying members their right to cancel or modify their contract, debtor has received hundreds of thousands of dollars in unearned revenue.

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And Your Honor, this conduct of the debtor is continuing to date. The Offices of these Attorneys General are receiving consumer complaints from constituents complaining that, for example, they have either tried to cancel their membership or are still being charged or that they have to tried to transfer their memberships to locations of the gym that are still open, but they are denied access. The debtor is still charging them membership dues.

In Massachusetts, Your Honor, we have received over 2,000 complaints since April. We've had 44 complaints come in this month alone on these issues. This is the highest volume of consumer complaints in a short period of time that we've received, that we've seen in recent history.

Accordingly, Your Honor, debtor is using unearned money to fund its operation.

It should be noted, however, that, while debtor continues to receive unearned revenue by illegally maintaining club memberships, six days before it filed for bankruptcy protection, the debtor entered into retention agreements with two of its senior officers, including Patrick Walsh, its CEO, who was paid \$1.5 million by the debtor. Mr. Walsh has since left employment of the debtor in or around October 15th.

I will note, also, Your Honor, that, during this time period, at the end of September going through the middle

of October, Patrick Walsh and his bankruptcy attorneys entered into an assurance of discontinuance with the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to resolve these consumer protection issues short of litigation, and then reneged on the agreement after telling the Commonwealth that it was going to move the Bankruptcy Court for approval of the agreement. And we were told that the lawyers that were involved and the CEO Patrick Walsh were not, in any way, armed with the authority to actually make the agreement that it made with the Commonwealth.

And it was because of these settlement negotiations and the agreement that we were promised that the Commonwealth didn't sooner, with its colleague states, bring an objection in this bankruptcy proceeding, either to the Chapter 11 plan or the sale of the company to the new TSI. And in fact, Massachusetts didn't sue TSI until later, after TSI pulled the carpet out from underneath us and reneged on the agreement.

In addition, in the Chapter 11 plan, this theme continues. The debtor barely mention the Attorney General's litigation. As the District and the Commonwealth have set forth in their objections, debtor in its plan makes no mention of our litigation, other than in the definitional section of the plan, which contains over 140 defined terms. Meanwhile, the debtor continues to use the money from the

illegally maintained club memberships to fund the working capital it needs to operate its business.

So, under Section 1129(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, a court shall not [sic] confirm a plan if, quote:

"-- the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden by law."

The District and the Commonwealth maintain that the Debtor TSI's plan was not proposed in good faith, that the debtor failed to bring forth the involvement that it has had in several -- with several State Attorneys General since it filed for bankruptcy and before it filed for bankruptcy, and it was not filed in good faith; and, therefore, the confirmation of the plan must be denied. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What's your reason again for waiting until the morning of the confirmation hearing to make an appearance and do anything about these complaints you've been hearing about since April?

MS. KAVANAGH: Your Honor, we were relying on the representations of bankruptcy counsel in this case. I don't -- I didn't see an announcement of the appearance of the bankruptcy firm that we were speaking to. The firms that were speaking to us were the Olshan Frome Wolosky, LLP, and Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani. And up until the very end of October and into the beginning of November, we believed we

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had an agreement with them, and that they were going to move the Court to get approval from the Court in the bankruptcy proceeding.

We have been told by various law firms that they don't represent the debtors, that they don't have authority to bind the debtor. Everybody has been pointing their fingers at each other, and we've been trying to work our way through this long and lengthy bankruptcy proceeding to try to figure out what is going on, who is in control, and who we can speak to and how to be able to have a voice here. So, because we have not received clarity and commitments, it took us a little while to figure out how to get involved, and we do apologize for our belatedness.

THE COURT: All right. Does anyone -- thank you very much. And I apologize, Ms. Alper, I don't know what's going on with regard to your connection. So I'm glad that your colleague was able to speak for you.

Does anyone else wish to be heard on these issues before I turn it back to Mr. Altman for a reply?

(No verbal response)

THE COURT: If you're trying to speak and I'm not responding, just wave so I know where you are. Yes, Mr. Averbuch?

MR. AVERBUCH: Your Honor (indiscernible) -THE COURT: Averbuch?

MR. AVERBUCH: Yes, this is Edward Averbuch, counsel for creditor Shakir Farsakh.

I'm not sure -- I got my audio working a bit late, so I'm not sure if this would be an appropriate time to speak in regards to my claim, or if this is just about the Commonwealth of Massachusetts right now.

THE COURT: Yeah, we'll get back to you. Unless your issue is related specifically to the discharge and the release, we'll deal with you -- we will deal with you, of course, but just not right this minute.

MR. AVERBUCH: It is related to the release, but obviously not with regard to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. So I'll go back on mute, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, no, no. Let me hear from you, let me hear from you.

MR. AVERBUCH: Okay. Thank you.

My client is a personal injury plaintiff, and we secured a verdict in his favor of \$750,000 a little over a year ago. With interest, his claim is \$823,000. After the verdict -- which, by the way, it was -- Town Sports was represented by Gordon Rees. They filed for -- they filed an appeal. And sometime throughout -- I think the appeal was originally due in July, and they asked for an extension of time. They granted it. And then, obviously, they filed for bankruptcy.

I have a letter that I received from Kennedys, which is the insurance company who -- which is the law firm that represents the insurance company that insures Town Sports, and I attached it as an exhibit to my objection, which is Docket Number 764; the letter is 764-1.

In particular, that -- it states that Town Sports refuses to tender the remaining portion of the five-hundred-thousand-dollar self-insured retention contained in the national casualty policy and relinquish control of its defense in the underlying action; and therefore, the insurance company denied coverage of this claim.

So I'm in the position here, where my client -- who is severely injured -- has, it sounds like, very little recourse in bankruptcy, if the plan is approved, because most of his claim will be wiped out. And there's now no insurance coverage, through no fault of my client. I believe that -- you know, and by the way, Your Honor, this letter is dated July 9th, 2020, I think, you know, at a time when the debtor certainly knew that this bankruptcy was impending.

I did reach out to counsel for the debtors in an attempt to kind of work this out a little bit, and they advised -- I was advised that they were not going to go back to their insurance carrier and try and resolve this issue and get coverage for my claim. So, because of this, I would request that, you know, this plan not be approved; or,

certainly, at least not with regard to my client's claim of 1 2 \$823,000. 3 THE COURT: Did you -- did your client vote in 4 connection with the plan? 5 MR. AVERBUCH: We did not vote in. And I believe 6 there was no affirmative vote required. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. AVERBUCH: And so my understanding is we are 9 opted out. THE COURT: Okay. All right. A lot going on here. 10 11 Mr. Altman, if you could address, first -- oh, I'm 12 sorry. Someone else. Yes, mister -- I'm sorry --13 MR. LONERGAN: Yes, it's Kyle --14 THE COURT: -- Lonergan. 15 MR. LONERGAN: -- Lonergan, Your Honor. THE COURT: Yep. Not Anna Lonergan? That might be 16 17 your spouse or --18 MR. LONERGAN: Yes, that's my wife's computer, it's 19 (indiscernible) but it's me, Kyle Lonergan, representing the 20 Kennedy Lewis parties in the proceeding, who are creditors 21 and pre-petition lenders. 22 And I only want to comment on these last-minute 23 changes to the confirmation order, which we had not seen 24 until now. And so I'm looking at the blackline here on the 25 fly. But you know, the one thing that I need to be sure of

is that my party -- my clients are opt-out parties, are not releasing claims in connection with the plan.

And previously, the form of the confirmation order,

I believed was pretty clear about that, in having an Exhibit

B and identifying my clients and stating that,

notwithstanding anything in the confirmation order or the

plan, they -- my parties would not be considered opt-out

parties.

There's new language in the confirmation order, talking about various releases that are going to take place in connection with the transaction, the distribution of equity that was just mentioned by debtors' counsel, and that the receipt of that equity wouldn't constitute a release for parties who have timely objected. And then there's discussion -- that's in Paragraph 70.

And then, in Paragraph 73, there's reference to a resolution between various parties. It's unclear to me if there's a -- if there's a contention here that somehow my clients are a party to that resolution, and whether they're deemed to have released anything.

But the bottom line is the new confirmation doesn't have an -- there's nothing listed on Exhibit B anymore. I'm not sure if those have been deleted or that's an oversight.

But I think the language needs to be clear in here, at least with respect to my parties, the Kennedy Lewis parties, that

1 nothing in this confirmation order is releasing their claims 2 because they have validly and timely opted out. 3 And we're not going to have, you know, arguments 4 after the fact, about whether my clients validly or timely 5 did anything. We just needed that to be clear. We have an 6 agreement with the debtor about that, and I just don't want 7 there to be any ambiguity. That's really it. 8 THE COURT: All right. No problem. 9 (Participants speak simultaneously) 10 THE COURT: Thank you. 11 MR. VAN AALTEN: Your Honor, this is Seth Van 12 Aalten for the committee. May I be heard? 13 THE COURT: Hang on. Mr. Greecher wanted to -- Mr. 14 Greecher? 15 MR. VAN AALTEN: Oh, okay. 16 MR. GREECHER: Sorry. I wanted to just clarify. 17 We did file a redline earlier today. It did not include the 18 list of the opt-out parties. But to counsel's point, the opt-out party exhibit has not changed. Kennedy Lewis Capital 19 20 Master -- Capital -- Kennedy Lewis Capital Partners Master 21 Fund, LP, and Kennedy Lewis Capital Partners Master Fund 2, 22 LP are both included on the Exhibit D of opt-out parties. 23 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Greecher. 24 Yes, Mr. Van Aalten?

MR. VAN AALTEN: Thank you, Your Honor. For the

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record, Seth Van Aalten from Cole Schotz, counsel to the committee.

Your Honor, the committee supports confirmation of the plan today. We filed a statement to that effect at Docket Number 707. The plan incorporates our settlement, Your Honor, with the debtors and the term lender group, through which \$1 million will be funded into the non-released claims trust, for the purpose of investigating and then, if appropriate, pursuing certain estate causes of action, to the extent of available insurance.

And it's through that vehicle, Your Honor, where we hope to furnish meaningful recoveries to unsecured creditors. And that required concessions on the part of the debtors through curtailments to certain release and injunction provisions that were provided in the initial plan, as well as from the term lender group, who agreed to remove its approximately \$87 million in deficiency claims from the unsecured creditor pool. That represented no less than 40 percent, and possibly as high as 80 percent of the unsecured claims pool, Your Honor.

I did have a chance to read the late-filed joinder to the U.S. Trustee's objection from the State AGs, Your Honor. The committee joins in the debtors' reply to these objections.

With respect to the State AGs objection, these are

pre-petition claims against the debtors, and the claims that the committee was very mindful in negotiating its settlement with the debtors and the term lender group to provide for the non-released claims trust, Your Honor. It is the conduct underlying the State AGs' claims that the non-released claims trustee will be investigating and, if appropriate, commencing litigation for the benefit of all unsecured creditors, including customers, including personal injury claimants, landlords, et cetera. And consequently, Your Honor, the committee does not view the plan as an attempt to disregard the AG litigation. It's certainly not an attempt to evade liability.

This is, no doubt, the best possible result under the circumstances, Your Honor, for the debtors' stakeholders. The committee believes the debtors have satisfied all requirements for confirmation of the amended plan today, and I'd be happy to address any questions Your Honor may have.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you. I'm trying to deal with the objections, Mr. Van Aalten, that have been laid before the Court. All right? We haven't even gotten to 1129 factors yet.

Mr. Altman, do you have any response?

MR. ALTMAN: Yes, Your Honor. I'm going to start by saying this was an incredibly challenging case. We sold all of the company's remaining assets, and there is just a

1 very small amount left, and that amount was negotiated with 2 the lenders, it's a million dollars. And as Mr. Van Aalten 3 said, the committee actively represented the interests of unsecured creditors. 4 5 So, to the issue with -- raised by the Attorneys 6 Generals, these claims are not disappearing. They're pre-7 petition actions that give rise to pre-petition claims. 8 Parties were able to file pre-petition claims and would 9 preserve their right. Their -- the recovery --10 THE COURT: Well, I heard --MR. ALTMAN: -- for those --11 12 THE COURT: -- allegations of post-petition 13 conduct. 14 MR. ALTMAN: So we (indiscernible) 15 MS. KAVANAGH: That's correct, Your Honor. There 16 is post-petition conduct at issue here. 17 THE COURT: All right. Please don't interrupt. 18 I'll interrupt, but don't interrupt. All right? Mr. Altman 19 didn't interrupt you. 20 MR. ALTMAN: Your Honor, with respect to the post-21 petition conduct allegations -- I won't speak for Mr. 22 Didonato, he can testify to this -- but the company granted 23 \$11.5 million in credits during the case, \$850,000 in pre-

petition cash refunds, \$1.8 million of chargebacks, which is

seven times their normal run rate -- "chargebacks," meaning a

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credit card processor charged back an amount and the credit - the company honored that. And right now, to the best of
the company's knowledge, there is no one that has requested a
refund that has not been provided for. Your Honor, I'm not
trying to testify here. Mr. Didonato is on. Those are just
the facts that he will testify to.

The economic claims that are post-petition, to the extent they are, they can be filed as administrative claims, and they will be sorted out. We don't believe there are any administrative claims from this alleged misconduct. And so there is no additional incremental estimate for that in the administrative claims pool because we believe that we have spent -- I'm just rounding here -- but 12.5, 13 -- almost \$15 million during the case for the benefit of parties that were harmed during this time period.

With respect to the non-economic elements of the Attorneys General's claims, the entity has been sold, so the police and regulatory issues are now with purchaser. To the extent current purchaser is not following any laws, that is not something that the debtor entity can have anything to do with.

I believe the last main point that was raised kind of encapsulating these issues is the discharge. It's just simply not a discharge, Your Honor. Indy Downs is clear that the release is (indiscernible) party contract, and parties

can contract. Parties have the right to opt out. We have an opt-out list. As counsel for Kennedy Lewis, you know, explained, they did opt out. We've actually been more generous in this case with allowing people to opt out than in most cases because of the circumstances. Those parties that sought to opt out did so by voting -- by reaching out to us or objecting to the plan.

THE COURT: You think you've been generous with allowing people to opt out? People have a right to opt out, if they don't agree to the contract. They are -- it's not a consensual release.

MR. ALTMAN: That's correct, Your Honor. I misspoke in terms of generosity. With respect to time lines and deadlines is what I was referring to.

THE COURT: All right. Well, let's deal with -oh, I'm sorry. I thought you were done. I apologize. Keep
going.

MR. ALTMAN: Those -- I were just going to address the other side issues, but we can handle those after this one, if you want, Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, no, no. Why don't you give a full response?

MR. ALTMAN: So, with respect to -- I believe with Mr. Averbuch, the personal injury plaintiff, it sounds like everything he's alleging -- the letter, I heard, was I

believe July 9th, 2020. That was obviously pre-petition. To the extent he filed a claim, it sounds like they did not vote. I'm not sure if they submitted a ballot to opt out. If they did submit a ballot and elect to opt out, they would be on the opt-out list. But other than that, his -- it's obviously a pre-petition injury, pre-petition damages, and they can pursue the claims process and insurance, if they want to seek to lift the injunction following confirmation.

As Mr. Greecher noted, with respect to Mr. Lonergan and Kennedy Lewis, that was just a redlining issue. The Exhibit B will include Kennedy Lewis.

I believe I have addressed all of the issues, Your Honor, that were raised, hopefully succinctly. If I missed anything, I reserve my right to go back to them.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Okay. Thank you.

So let me just offer some comments and tell you what we're going to do. First of all, you know, Article 9 -- and I glanced at it as we were all having these discussions, I'm certainly not as familiar with it as the parties -- appears -- I mean, it clearly, as revised, doesn't say discharged. But it says, to the extent possible, under the discharge provision.

I don't quite see the point in invoking the statute
-- invoking a section of the statute (indiscernible) that
gives a discharge or says when you can't get a discharge if

you're clearly not entitled to a discharged. Now I'm not actually sure you're not clearly entitled to a discharge, but I'm a little worried that the language in there might preserve the right for debtors' successors or -- well, debtors' successors to argue they did get a discharge and -- based on the fact that this language is still in the order. So I kind of want to throw that out there.

I don't have, generally, a problem with somebody saying, you know, to the extent a -- to the extent -- to the greatest extent under applicable law, I'm granted a release. And then we can negotiate -- we can litigate, if we have to, 20 years down the line, what the "greatest extent of applicable law" means. And 9,999 time out of 10,000, that never happens. But I am a little worried about putting something in there that invokes a section that, at least facially, doesn't appear to even be applicable.

With regard to consensual releases, I'm actually —
I have to say — well, "offended" is the wrong word — but
taken aback by this argument that people cannot consent to
give another party a release because the Code doesn't give a
discharge. I don't care what the Code gives. Individuals
have a right to contract, they have a constitutional right to
contract. And if they want to contract in a way that allows
them to give a release, that's up to them. It's not my job
to make sure that they're not giving away what they didn't

have to give away in the first place.

Now, using the mechanisms of the Bankruptcy Code as a vehicle to achieving that release, that -- it's -- that might be a little trickier, and I think maybe that's the point of the argument. It's not that people don't have the right to contract and give a release, but it's that we shouldn't invoke, you know, the plan mechanism to provide for that release when there's not going to be a discharge. I think that's a tenuous argument. It's the only argument, I think, that holds any water at all, possibly, under Mr. Buchbinder's approach, and his other government, you know, colleagues.

I am very worried about the allegations of the Attorneys General today with regard to both pre, but more importantly post-petition activity, and misrepresentations, perhaps, by parties that they had the right to bind the debtors while they were speaking to the Government. To say that's serious is quite the understatement.

So -- and of course, I'm -- not -- well, I'm a little flummoxed by the late appearance. But it is what it is, as my colleague Judge Shannon likes to say. It is what it is, we are where we are, let's eat lunch. We're not going to eat lunch, but we are going to do something because I don't like where we are and I don't like what it is. So we're going to need some time to figure this thing out. And

also, I want to think about it, frankly, in the context of Mr. Buchbinder and the Attorneys General's objection.

Now with regard to the personal injury claimant,

I'm a little -- sort of little -- I don't know quite what to

do with it. It's clearly a pre-petition claim. You might

have a claim against the insurance company, you might have a

claim against the debtor. If you have a claim against the

debtor, it's a pre-petition unsecured claim. And if you got

notice of the bar date, you needed to -- well, excuse me, not

the -- yeah -- no, excuse me, not the bar date. If you got

notice of the confirmation, you needed to do something.

Now you did object. I don't know about voting. Of course, you're not constitutionally required to vote. You don't have to vote if you don't want to vote. But if you want to opt out, the way this all works, you need to take some sort of affirmative action to opt out. So, if you haven't opted out, it may be the case that your client is potentially in a position where he or she -- and I apologize, I don't know your client's gender. It doesn't really --

MR. AVERBUCH: He.

THE COURT: -- but -- he -- whether he may have -- he may have waived that claim, but we're not going to deal with that.

So here's what we are going to do because there are a couple of things going on here. There are some latecomers

that need to be engaged. There needs to be some due diligence done by the debtors on what exactly happened or they alleged -- was alleged to have happened. And I think there needs to be some negotiation. And I'm speaking about, specifically, the Attorneys General, a little less Mr. Buchbinder, and maybe even a little more less Mr. Averbuch.

It sounds like, Mr. Lonergan, that your issues -- and I know the frustration of getting a last-minute redline.

I'm sure it's not the first one you've ever received, but it sounds like your issues are preserved.

What I'd like to do -- and we may -- there may be more we can do before this hearing is over, I'm not saying the hearing is over. But these issues are going to get continued, which means this portion of confirmation at least is going to get continued, to allow me to think more carefully on the issues, and hopefully, you guys to try to figure out a path forward on a consensual basis. But if you don't, you don't, and I'll make my rulings.

I haven't even -- you know, look, I haven't even read the Attorneys General's objections, so I'm just acting off of what I heard orally, or I guess aurally -- a-u-r-a-l-1-y.

Thursday, at -- well, I hate to do this to Mr.

McKane on the west coast, but Thursday, at 9:30 would work

the best for me. I have a very full day that day, but if we

start early, or what I consider early, I think we'll be all right. Now I know this might mess with -- does this mess with -- hang on. I'm putting it on my calendar, so I don't forget what I just said.

To the extent this messes with any deadlines or, you know -- I'm not -- my head is not coming up with the word, but the things lenders -- milestones. To the extent this disagrees with any or interferes with any milestones, I don't know what to say. That's just going to have to be what it is. It's only three days, so ... all right. So that's all preserved.

MR. ALTMAN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: And Mr. Altman, you're going to -- or your coll -- some of your colleagues are going to engage, I hope, with all the people we were speaking with, maybe further with Mr. Buchbinder, further with the Attorneys General, and further with Mr. Averbuch, and we'll see what we have.

MR. ALTMAN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And if you don't reach an agreement, that's fine, I'll make the decision. But I'll be more prepared to make a decision on Thursday.

MR. ALTMAN: Yes, Your Honor. My email is on all of the pleadings, so if the Attorneys General group wants to shoot an email to Ms. Greenblatt and myself, we will set up a

1 call this afternoon. 2 (Participants speak simultaneously) 3 THE COURT: Hang on, hang on. Mr. Buchbinder, yes. I think I heard your voice, did I note? 4 5 MR. BUCHBINDER: This is Dave Buchbinder. I was 6 actually not speaking, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Oh, all right. 8 MR. BUCHBINDER: Thank you. 9 (Participants speak simultaneously) THE COURT: I don't know what -- I don't know what 10 that's like. 11 12 (Laughter) 13 (Participants speak simultaneously) 14 THE COURT: Hang on, hang on, hang on. Yes, Mr. 15 Lonergan. 16 MR. LONERGAN: Yes, just quickly. Listen, I'm 17 happy to hear we're still on Exhibit B and that it still 18 exists. There are these new -- and I appreciate that things 19 get done at the last minute in these proceedings. I just --20 I do want to be part of the continued engagement with the 21

debtor, just about the new language, just to make sure that 22 we can get comfort that, you know, our rights are being 23 preserved and we are opted out of the releases. But I think 24 it will be easy to do. I would like to use that time you're 25 giving us to do that.

MR. ALTMAN: Your Honor, we'll make sure to call 1 2 Mr. Lonergan and coordinate. 3 MR. LONERGAN: Thank you. MR. CHUBAK: Your Honor, this is Jeffrey Chubak of 4 5 Amini, LLC, on behalf of Peak Credit. We second the concerns (indiscernible) and we're 6 7 hopeful that it will reach agreement (indiscernible) also 8 (indiscernible) confirmation hearing and have an issue with 9 some of the terms articulated that the release be conditioned, entry into a mutually agreeable (indiscernible) 10 agreement (indiscernible) equity is (indiscernible) 11 12 referenced (indiscernible) equity to the pre-petition 13 lenders, as indicated in the declaration, but do believe that 14 it should -- that the release should be conditioned on entry 15 into a shareholders agreement (indiscernible) Gibson Dunn in 16 its absolute discretion. 17 We've actually (indiscernible) advised Gibson Dunn 18 that we are going to providing a draft. I -- Your Honor, I see that there's -- I'm raising --19 20 THE COURT: Well, I'm --21 MR. CHUBAK: -- this issue because 22 THE COURT: First of all, I'm having a hard time 23 hearing you. But second of all -- who do you represent 24 again? MR. CHUBAK: Peak Credit, LLC, which is --25

THE COURT: You're the buyer. 1 2 MR. CHUBAK: -- (indiscernible) owner. Yes. 3 THE COURT: All right. So you're not an objector. 4 MR. CHUBAK: There are provisions in the 5 confirmation order that affect us, and we learned that was added 15 minutes before the hearing. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. Well, I have --8 MR. CHUBAK: (Indiscernible) put it over. 9 THE COURT: Yeah, absolutely, absolutely. Not a 10 problem. Is there anything else, Mr. Altman? I don't 11 12 require you to go through the 1129 factors, you know, you 13 filed your memo, so that's more than enough. I think the --14 MR. ALTMAN: That's all --15 THE COURT: -- open issue --16 MR. ALTMAN: -- I was going to say, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. So I think the open issues for 18 Thursday are, I guess, the unresolved objections or comments 19 from Mr. Averbuch's client, Mr. Chubak's client, Mr. 20 Lonergan's client, and the Attorneys General and Mr. 21 Buchbinder. And of course any changes you've made to the 22 order right before the hearing, I think parties should have a 23 fair opportunity to comment on and object to, if they think it's appropriate. 24 25 And maybe you'll be able to work these all out; if

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not, I'm going to spend some time, probably tonight, actually, getting up to speed. I'm going to read the objections again because it's an interesting issue. If I can stomach it, I'll read Indianapolis Downs again. But that's kind of where I'd like to go. Does that sound okay to you? I guess you don't really have a choice, you need to say yes. (Laughter) MR. ALTMAN: Your Honor, that is a -- that is a great solution for us. THE COURT: All right. Anything further for today? I think that was the only motion on, if I -- the only item on the agenda. MR. ALTMAN: That's right, Your Honor. Everything else was resolved, including the cure objections --THE COURT: Yes, I say that. MR. ALTMAN: -- I believe (indiscernible) THE COURT: Thank you very much. And Mr. Greecher, thank you for your update over the weekend, that was very helpful. MR. GREECHER: Of course, Your Honor. THE COURT: (Indiscernible) MR. GREECHER: And if I could, Your Honor --THE COURT: Sorry to contact you so late. MR. GREECHER: I'm always available for Your Honor. One question -- or one note just as to Mr.

Averbuch's client. Again, apologies for not including the 1 2 exhibit list with the redline line that we filed this 3 afternoon. But Mr. Farsakh is included on the list of the opt-out parties, so I think that that should assuage the 4 5 concern with Mr. Averbuch that they are a non-released/nonreleasing party under the plan. 6 7 THE COURT: Okay. Well, engage in a conversation, but that's good to hear. 8 9 For Thursday, we're going to use the same Zoom 10 information -- sorry, Mr. Didonato -- the same ID and same 11 passcode. All right. 12 Thank you. We're adjourned. 13 COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Judge. 14 Thank you, Your Honor. 15 (Proceedings adjourned to 12/17/20) 16 (Concluded at 3:10 p.m.)

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<u>CERTIFICATION</u>

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my knowledge and ability.

Aduland December 15, 2020

Coleen Rand, AAERT Cert. No. 341

Certified Court Transcriptionist

For Reliable